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The numbers of well-known software vulnerabilities continue to increase and will 
likely worsen as even more powerful and complex applications emerge.  Traditionally, 
information technology managers have combated network vulnerabilities with a variety of 
approaches.  The most common involves applying the latest patch (“hot fix”) or service 
pack to a computer system, while maintaining stringent access control lists (ACLs) on 
routers and firewalls to filter network traffic.  This last method, though somewhat effective, 
is limited in that even the best effort approaches to separating good and bad network traffic 
can be circumvented. Unfortunately, technologies such as these are intended to serve 
primarily as perimeter network defense systems, but have quickly become the panacea of 
network security.  In many cases, a false sense of security has been created and a large 
number of networks fall prey to well-known exploits because the recommended system 
patches have not been applied to vulnerable systems.  Additionally, 80% of system 
compromises originate within the local network, leaving the perimeter controls at a 
significant disadvantage (Konigsberg, 2002).  While the most basic tenets of securing 
computing systems are the application of system patches, fewer patches are being applied as 
networking environments become more complex.  
The proposed research within this thesis evaluated whether automated network 
vulnerability scanning software solutions would provide a reliable and cost effective means 
to manage the growing numbers of operating systems and applications vulnerabilities, while 
providing a greater ability to comply with federal requirements in the area of information 
security practices for Naval Medicine components.  This project also provided an analysis of 
the total number of systems compromises over the past 12 months and concluded that 
vulnerability scanning and remediation procedures were not being performed expediently 
enough to meet the current information assurance threats.  
Knowing there will always be differences in the way organizations respond to 
potential threats, common to them will be maintaining an effective patch management 
program, becoming even more important as zero-day exploits begin to appear on a more 
 xviii
regular basis.  The ability to incorporate this, as well as new and emerging concepts and 
practices, will ultimately determine the future success of any organization’s information 
security program. 
It should be noted that there are other security models that do not depend on patch 
management, or supplement it, but will not be covered in this work.  Managing and patching 
systems is now a way of life in our industry, and until such time as they are unnecessary, 





I. INTRODUCTION  
A. SITUATION ANALYSIS  
The number of well-known software vulnerabilities, on average, has doubled 
every year since 1998 (CERT, 2003) and will likely worsen as even more powerful and 
complex applications emerge.  In 2002, more than 4,000 well known vulnerabilities were 
listed and over 82,000 incidents were reported to CERT (CERT, 2003). Surprisingly, 
99% of reported incidents resulted from not having well-known exploits patches on 
affected computing systems (Shipley, January 23, 2003).  
Traditionally, information technology professionals have thwarted network 
vulnerabilities using a variety of approaches.  One of the most common involves applying 
the latest patch or service pack to a computer system, while maintaining stringent access 
control lists (ACLs) on routers and firewalls to filter network traffic.  It is well 
recognized that even the best approaches to separating good and bad network traffic can 
be circumvented, which has lead to numerous implementations of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) to provide notification of suspected malicious network traffic.                                                
Modern approaches to network security are focused on signature based 
recognition and access control lists (ACLs), such as are found in firewalls and routers, 
and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitoring. Unfortunately, these technologies are 
intended to serve primarily as perimeter network defense systems, but have quickly 
become the perceived panacea of network security.  In many cases, because the 
recommended system patches are not applied to vulnerable systems, a large number of 
networks fall prey to a false sense of security from the aforementioned perimeter defense, 
and are victims of well-known exploits.  Additionally, 80% of system compromises 
originate within the local network, leaving the firewall and certain IDS at a significant 
disadvantage (Konigsberg, 2002).  Recent surveys also indicate that the majority of 
attacks are directed at port 80, which has traditionally not been filtered since it facilitates 
Web traffic (Burns, 2003). While the most basic tenets of securing computing systems 
are the application of system patches, it has become a seemingly less practiced task as 
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networking environments become more complex, and defenses are being thrust to the 
perimeter.    
Maintaining a relatively secure computing network has become a comprehensive 
task for many information technology managers.  Preparing for the next wave of system 
exploits to approach the Internet remains a mystery to many information managers unable 
to keep abreast of the trends.  Commonly known vulnerabilities and the attacks associated 
with them are well documented, such as the buffer overflow; however, these 
vulnerabilities have not been fully addressed and corrected by the vendors for a variety of 
reasons.  For those that even realize the importance of patching systems, many have 
concerns of system patch incompatibility and fear that the available patches may disrupt 
or negatively impact the computing system operation.  Protecting information systems 
can equate to ensuring that the most recent software patches have been applied to every 
known vulnerable system, but knowing of every patch or update, and their possible side-
effects, becomes a virtually impossible task.  Management of these systems becomes a 
somewhat daunting task then, as the number of vulnerabilities increases, the number of 
systems to be managed grows, and information technology staffing remains the same or 
decreases due to cutbacks.   
The proposed research evaluates whether automated network vulnerability 
scanning software solutions can provide a reliable and cost effective means to manage the 
growing numbers of operating systems and applications vulnerabilities, while providing a 
greater ability to comply with federal requirements in the area of information security 
practices.  The research focuses on determining what, if any, formal patch management 
practices exist and how current actions can be supplemented with automated vulnerability 
scanning and patching technologies. 
This study is of particular importance to the command personnel charged with the 
responsibility and accountability of Naval Medicine’s networks and electronic data 
systems.  The supervisors, educators and trainers of today will develop the leaders of 
tomorrow, who will become responsible for ensuring that mission essential objectives are 
completed.  To accomplish this, leaders must know what people need or desire to get the 
best performance from them.  This research offers practical information regarding 
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modern patch management techniques and the technologies available to assist them in 
that effort.   
The Internet has become essential for most organizations and has grown 
exponentially in the number of private parties obtaining access each year.  As more 
people engage in electronic activity, the potential threat increases at the same rate (Azari, 
2003).  There will always be differences in the way people and organizations respond to 
potential threats, but maintaining an effective patch management program will become 
even more important as zero-day exploits begin to appear.  The ability to incorporate this, 
as well as new and emerging concepts and practices will ultimately determine the future 
success of any organization’s information security program. 
B. PREMISE AND HYPOTHESIS 
Based on prior experience handling incident reports of subordinate command 
computer compromises, and following through with mitigation of known vulnerabilities 
within Naval Medicine, observation suggests at least three out of four compromises 
resulted from lack of timely patch administration.  In conducting the research for this 
thesis, this observational figure posed a suitable point from which to pursue the following 
hypothesis: 75 percent of Naval Medicine’s known information systems compromises 
were not protected by the available vulnerability patch(es). 
C. DEFINITIONS 
1. Naval Medicine   
The Department of the Navy healthcare organization, composed of approximately 
400 individual units responsible for maintaining the health of all Navy and Marine Corps 
personnel. 
2. Information System   
Hardware and software, application programs and devices that input, process, 
store and/or output electronic data elements. 
3. System Compromise  
Any unauthorized system events or data theft occurring on an information system.  
4. Vulnerability Patch   
4 
A software and or hardware vendor remedy that corrects known system 
vulnerabilities or operating system errors. 
D. DISCLAIMER AND LIMITATIONS 
The information used to compile research findings is utilized to satisfy the 
academic reporting requirements needed for completion of a Master of Science degree in 
Information Systems Technology from the Naval Postgraduate School.  Surveys will be 
limited in distribution to Naval Medicine Chief Information Officers.  Additionally, 
completed survey questionnaires and any other organizational data utilized within this 
research paper will be held in strict confidence and used solely for the indicated purpose. 
Secondary research efforts may be limited by the number of personnel employed 
within Naval Medicine available, or their willingness to participate in the Information 
Assurance Management Survey.  The total percentage of known information systems 
compromises that were not protected by the available vulnerability patch will be 
extracted from the survey results to validate or invalidate the premise.  Additionally, the 
length of the academic term further limits the scope of the study.  Lastly, the efforts of 
this research may not accurately represent the other components of the United States 
Navy in regards to Chief Information Officers or any other Department of Defense 














Today, the only thing that seems certain is change.  Business and operational 
environments have undergone significant transformations over the past decade. The 
constant stream of differing and more powerful Internet technologies, networked systems, 
and applications have refined processes and simultaneously created a surfeit of system 
vulnerabilities.  This problem tends to increase each time a new technology or a system 
with more features is introduced.  If the increasing complexity is coupled with other 
issues associated with expanding enterprises, it is relatively easy to imagine that the 
proper management and control of such technologies could be difficult at best.  A 
primary concern regarding these technologies is ensuring information security; though  it 
is often one of the most difficult items to justify in annual budgets as it becomes more 
difficult to assess, prioritize and measure corrective methods to counter the known risks 
or threats. Personnel, knowledge, funding, tools, and training are therefore seemingly 
obvious deficiencies in information security environments.    
B. CURRENT GLOBAL NETWORK THREATS 
A small nation-state now has the ability to cripple a large adversary by 
compromising unprotected information system controls.  Electrical grids, water treatment 
facilities, airline communications systems, financial systems, and many others are 
susceptible to compromises by anyone with the appropriate skill levels, equipment, and 
time.  A system can be monitored and maintained to resist or repel known threats, but one 
sophisticated hacker can wreak havoc in minutes.  A well-publicized example of how 
quickly and successfully an attack can be performed was demonstrated by the Slammer 
Worm (AKA: Sapphire), which was released on 25 January 2003.  The Slammer worm 
was the fastest-spreading worm in computing history, primarily due to its small total size 
of 404 bytes, which included the header.  Slammer was an exploit of a buffer overflow in 
Microsoft’s SQL server and applications created with the Microsoft Server 2000 Desktop 
Engine. Within 3 minutes of its release, the total number of infected hosts doubled every 
8.5 seconds.  Thirty minutes later, the worm and its clones were scanning 55 million IP 
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addresses per second.  Within 40 minutes, approximately 90% of all susceptible hosts had 
been compromised (McGuirl, 2004).   
Although Slammer was not carrying a malicious payload, it did cause significant 
collateral damage.  Twenty-seven million Korean mobile phone and Internet accounts 
were offline, more than a 100,000 Portuguese cable modems were offline, 13,000 Bank 
of America ATMS were downed, and emergency service providers in Seattle lost 
dispatch capabilities for hours while attempting to service a community of 700,000 
people.  Mi2g Limited, an English security firm, estimated that Slammer costs reached 
$1.2B in productivity losses (McGuirl, 2004).   
The Slammer incident is one of many examples where a vendor patch was 
available for a well-known exploit for more than 6 months, but had not been applied to 
the affected systems.  Slammer is not the first, nor the last, to be seen.  We must not 
forget while history repeats itself, in cyberspace it replicates.  Two previous worms that 
caused similar issues were the Code Red IIS ISAPI buffer overflow attack and the Nimda 
Worm that exploited an IIS Web traversal vulnerability.  Again, anyone who experienced 
these attacks could have prevented them if they had simply applied the patch 3 to 4 weeks 
after the vulnerabilities had been announced. 
Slammer originated with one initial instance of a compromise.  If one considered 
that a number of these exploit attempts and break-ins occur on a daily basis, the concept 
may impose more concern.  To determine just how much malicious activity occurs on the 
Internet, I-trap Security Services, based in Cleveland, Ohio, monitored and analyzed two 
weeks of internet traffic from a 10,000 node ISP enterprise that serviced Tel Aviv 
University, the largest university in Israel.  A two-week sampling recorded 180,000 
attack events. Those events consisted of scanning and actual break-in attempts.  
Approximately 96 percent of the recorded scans were followed by attacks from the same 
source.  That is a staggering number in itself, but it is more important to recognize that 
roughly 90% of those attacks are generated by worm activity.  Any organization relying 
on perimeter controls such as firewalls, router access control lists, intrusion prevention 
systems or anti-virus tools would not have been protected.  The I-trap report indicated 
that most of the attacks originating from China and the United States were automated; 
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however, it should be noted that attack totals were supported by 99 differing countries 
around the globe.  Another interesting note from the sample was that more than 139,000 
of those attacks (75%) were directed at port 80, the port used for standard Web (HTML) 
page transfers. (Burns, 2003)   
Today’s most competitive organizations, whether private, corporate or 
government-funded, are employing their personnel with the fastest and most efficient 
computing systems to perform their tasks.  The majority of those systems interface with 
the Internet, and the electronic transactions and/or data stored on those systems is at risk 
– some more than others, but at risk nonetheless.  If these risks are discovered by anyone 
with malicious intent, the organization’s image and livelihood can be damaged in a 
number of ways.  System compromises can result in, but are not limited to, media 
attention, public embarrassment, financial losses, whether stolen or incurred by penalty, 
increased maintenance for restoration efforts, and loss of productivity in downed systems.  
Protecting information system assets in a globally connected world requires a dedicated 
amount of time and funding to counter the existing threats.  A near real time vulnerability 
scanning and patching process is the last line of defense in protecting information assets 
once perimeter filters have been breached (Nicolett and Pescatore, 2003).    
C.  CULTURE CONTRIBUTORS 
Computing systems technology has reached approximately 25 percent of homes 
worldwide in the past decade (Azari, 2003).  The world we lived in just ten years ago has 
been replaced with much more convenient and less expensive methods of performing 
daily tasks, methods driven by technology that affects nearly everything imaginable in 
our daily lives.  These changes range from daily transactions involving purchases and 
sales to monetary transfers, safety devices, and communications systems, among many 
others. Global connections link the majority of markets and institutions around the world 
and significantly affect the overall economy.  Military components tout cyber warfare as 
the new order for combat operations, and a number of technology-driven weapons 
systems, often referred to as smart weapons, are fast replacing conventional methods of 
warfare.   
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The technological revolution even affects those millions that don’t use the 
Internet or other technological advances.  As previously mentioned, anyone relying on 
electricity, purified water, public transportation or financial systems can be affected by 
technology because it also drives the majority of those systems.  This continued reliance 
on technology will continue to enforce its utilization and dependence.     
D. VULNERABILITY STATISTICS 
Although it was not the first, one of the most widely recognized worms was 
designed by Robert Morris in 1998.  The Morris worm introduced many to the reality of 
cyber threats as it invaded approximately 6000 computers within a couple of hours.  In 
1998, this figure represented 10% of the entire Internet.  The worm was not destructive, 
but it did prove the powers of a buffer overflow.  This event had two beneficial 
outcomes: the realization that dangers do exist in a connected world, and more 
importantly, the genesis of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), which 
was developed as a notification and dissemination point for known vulnerabilities.  The 
CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) is supported by federal research funds and is 
operated by Carnegie Mellon University.  Many information assurance practitioners have 
reviewed their advisories about vulnerabilities, bugs, patches, and where to find the fixes 
to those known problems (Rubin, 2001).  Figures 1 through 3 display the number of 
reported incidents, vulnerabilities and the percentages of increase from 1988 through 
2003, respectively.  
The number of incidents reported over the past five years produces a wide range 
of assumptions.  The Internet, and incidence of malicious code, has grown substantially.  
Reported incidents may not necessarily be the actual number of incidents as many 
organizational reputations may be at risk for simply admitting they have experienced an 
incident. What may not be as obvious is the fact that many more organizations are 










Figure 2.   Number of Vulnerabilities Reported. From CERT/CC Statistics For 
Vulnerabilities (2003). 
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The number of new vulnerabilities specifically indicates those that have not been 
seen before.  Many are reiterations of earlier ones, but they are still different.  On 24 
February 2004, at the annual RSA panel discussion, Quals reported that “the lifespan of 
some vulnerabilities is unlimited” and that “50% of the most prevalent and critical 
vulnerabilities are being replaced on an annual basis”(Eschelbeck, 2004). Quals also 
presented a differing total number of vulnerabilities based on vulnerability data from 
December 2003.  Their presentation submitted that there have been a total 3,011,000 IP 
scans, 1,905,000 total critical vulnerabilities, 2,054 different vulnerabilities and 1,175 
different critical vulnerabilities.  Their definition of critical was defined as “Providing an 
attacker the ability to gain full control of the system and/or leakage of highly sensitive 
information.  For example, vulnerabilities may enable full read and/or write access to 
files, remote execution of command, and the presence of backdoors”(Eschelbeck, 2004).  
During 2002, the Security Alert Consensus said there were approximately 1000 
new operating system and applications vulnerabilities, which equates to roughly 83 new 
vulnerabilities per month.  During 2003, SecurityFocus reported 7,679 vulnerabilities in 
their database, while NISTS ICAT metabase listed only 5,712 and the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures Group at mitre.org listed only 2,573 (Shipley, June 26, 
2003).  It seems rather confusing that such drastic differences are reported, but the 
important thing to remember is that there are thousands of vulnerabilities that have been 
identified and there are likely thousands more that have not been discovered.  Becoming 
aware of them and guarding information systems from those threats are the only ways a 
connected organization will be able survive the onslaught of malicious code floating 
around in cyberspace.  “In short, when it comes to compromise of data confidentiality, 




Figure 3.   CERT/CC Statistics for Percent of Annual Increase. From CERT/CC Statistics for 
Percent of Annual Increase (2003). 
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As of 20 May 2004, the past four years of NIST-analyzed vulnerability types were 
as follows: 
Table 1. Statistics on all NIST Analyzed Vulnerabilities.  
From http://icat.nist.gov/vt_portal.cfm 
Note:  This table shows the distribution of various vulnerability characteristics. The raw 
number in each cell is the number of vulnerabilities that meet that particular 
characteristic for that year. The percentage to the right of each raw number is the 
percentage of vulnerabilities having that particular characteristic for that year.   
The increases and a select number of decreases in vulnerabilities and incidents 
can be directly related to the widespread releases of new operating systems software and 
applications, while additional decreases can be attributed to the investments made in 
information assurance practices to combat such threats.  Some analysts contend that the 
rise in reports is due to the increased numbers of people that are monitoring the network 
and the recent expansions of the unsophisticated consumer market obtaining broadband 
connections such as DSL and cable modems.  These types of connections are always on 
and present immediate dangers to the system owner if not configured or protected by 
filtering devices such as firewalls. (Goth, 2004)  
E. THE THREAT PERSPECTIVE 
The United States military services are not excluded from the same vulnerabilities 
that confront the rest of the free world.  To get an idea of just how many times the 
Statistics on all NIST Analyzed Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability Type 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Vulnerability Count 264 1007 1307 1506 
Remote Attack 193 (73%) 755 (75%) 1052 (80%) 1056 (70%) 
Local Attack 75 (28%) 252 (25%) 275 (21%) 524 (35%) 
Denial of Service 68 (26%) 281 (28%) 330 (25%) 419 (28%) 
OS Vulnerabilities 56 (21%) 163 (16%) 212 (16%) 248 (16%) 
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military services have faced vulnerability incidents, consider the following links that 
showcase past hacker activities.  
Current attack postings are available at zone-h.org at http://www.zone-
h.org/en/defacements/.  It is disturbing to know that new attacks are posted nearly every 
minute of every day.  At certain times, there are multiple attacks occurring within one 
minute around the globe.  This site clearly displays the operating system that was 
compromised.  A quick review will provide all the proof required to dispel the myth that 
some operating systems cannot be breached.  
The digital attacks archive link on the left column of zone-h.org’s web page will 
redirect a Web browser to the primary archive.  If desired, add the filter “.mil” to view 
what the services have encountered in the past.  OSD, SPAWAR, and even some of Navy 
Medicine's Web pages are easily found within the archive.  A visit to the breakout link 
within the attrition.org site at http://www.attrition.org/mirror/attrition/ allows one to view 
even more .mil and other federal agency defacements.  According to this mirror site, 
since July 1999, 186 defacements have occurred on .mil domains, and 42 (approximately 
23%) of those were Navy-specific. 
F. THREAT AWARENESS AND RESPONSE RESOURCES 
A significant number of resources exist to alert and help information systems 
personnel defend their assets. Many of them are listed on the NIST Vulnerability and 
Threat Portal http://icat.nist.gov/vt_portal.cfm  Links to other competent vulnerability 
notification organizations such as The US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT), the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, and the SANS Institute are linked from the NIST portal.  
Each of them differs slightly, but each is an excellent resource.  Users can submit to 
mailing lists for frequent vulnerability updates. 
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs the US Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) and provides the US-CERT Current Activity 
Web page, which offers an up to date summary of the most frequent and devastating 
types of information security incidents.  This resource is located at: http://www.us-
cert.gov/current/current_activity.html.  The CERT/CC Incident Notes Web page is 
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maintained by the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute and is located at 
http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/.  Another feature page maintained by the Carnegie 
Mellon CERT® Coordination Center provides Steps for Recovering from a UNIX or NT 
System Compromise.  That resource can be found at http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/win-
UNIX-system_compromise.html.  
 The ICAT Metabase is maintained by the Computer Security Division at the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology.  The ICAT is an index of searchable 
computer vulnerabilities. It also provides a search capability at a granular level that links 
users to vulnerability and patch information and can be found at 
http://icat.nist.gov/icat.cfm.  
The System Administration, Networking, and Security Institute (SANS) 
showcases the SANS Top 20 Internet Security Vulnerabilities at 
http://www.sans.org/top20/.  The SANS Top 20 is the merger of two top-ten lists.  
Specifically, it provides the ten most commonly exploited vulnerable services in 
Windows and the ten most commonly exploited vulnerable services in UNIX and Linux 
operating systems. There are a great number of security incidents occurring every year 
that affect these popular operating systems, but the majority of the successful attacks 
focus on one or more of the twenty identified vulnerabilities.  It should be noted that the 
twenty vulnerabilities are those that are considered by a number of security experts to be 
the most critical vulnerabilities that warrant immediate attention.  The entire process is 
coordinated by leading security experts that practice security roles in some of the most 
information security-focused agencies around the world.  This is not limited to, but 
includes information from, security vendors, consulting organizations and a number of 
the top university-driven security programs.  The SANS Institute Internet site also 
maintains a reading room archive rich in resources pertaining to policy, risk assessment 
procedures as well as a number of other information security-related topics. 
Last, but not least, Bugtraq is considered by many to be the most important 
Internet information security list. Vulnerabilities announcements are often posted here 
well in advance of the government-sponsored resources previously referenced.  A number 
of current and previous archives can be found at http://www.ntbugtraq.com.  
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Each of these noted services is a dynamic and ever-changing resource, from step-
by-step instructions to additional links regarding information useful for correcting known 
security flaws. Most generally, each of them provide feedback links for continuous 
improvement initiatives and encourage participation in fighting the good fight in the 
continuous battles involved in the information security arena. 
G. WHAT IT MAY TAKE TO COUNTER FUTURE THREATS 
The future holds many uncertainties, but the experts agree that the cyber universe 
is a dangerous place to conduct electronic transactions, whether business or personal.  
There are a number of reasons those dangers exist.   The reality of the bits and bytes 
world is that nothing is bulletproof.  NIST recently reported that 36% of vulnerabilities 
are resultant of configuration or design problems, and the rest are due to programming 
errors.  “Of those errors ‘the basic mistakes’—buffer overflows, directory traversal 
attacks, format string vulnerabilities, symlink attacks, cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, 
and shell metacharacter issues—are responsible for 51 to 64 percent of vulnerabilities” 
(Goth, 2004).  Remediating the known vulnerabilities in a timely manner and configuring 
systems to repel attacks remain the best known defenses.     
If these realities are not heeded, they will be costly in terms of lost data, downed 
systems, or legal penalties.   To counter a threat, two basic concepts must be understood: 
The threat has to be identified; only then can it be responded to.  Those two factors will 
determine your overall effectiveness in thwarting the threat.  NIST and other 
vulnerability summary organizations are now facing the challenges of keeping pace with 
the outbreaks of vulnerabilities, identifying them so a response can be developed.  The 
decreasing window of time between discovery and remediation has incited the need for 
even more efficient processes for determining the identifiers for inclusion into the 
industry standard Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Dictionary.  The CVE 
in and of itself is not a database; it is simply a dictionary of vulnerabilities and exposures 
(Goth, 2004). 
To combat increasingly sophisticated and more aggressive cyber attacks, 
everyone will be required to entertain new approaches, tools and services to increase their 
chance of survival.  The standard practices of waiting for alerts and patching when 
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convenient is already becoming ineffective.  It is predicted that “soon computers will face 
‘Warhol’ threats that spread across the Internet and infect systems worldwide within 15 
minutes.  In a few years, the Net will be hit by ‘flash threats that can spread in just 
seconds…’” (Evers, 2003).  Leading researchers and security experts further predict that 
during 2004, the number of remote procedure call (RPC) exploits will continue to appear.  
The RPC is a primary component required to manage client-server computing.  These 
procedures are not restricted to Microsoft operating systems and Jeff Moss, President and 
CEO of Black Hat, Inc. reported that hackers are now looking for areas that are not being 
addressed.  “In particular, hackers are exploring ways to attack memory ‘heaps,’ or areas 
of computer memory that are created dynamically when programs run.” (Roberts, 2003)    
The ever-increasing rates of information systems compromises have also gained 
the immediate attention of the federal government over the past decade.  As voters 
become more dissatisfied with the level of protection their private information is 
afforded, the requirements and penalties imposed for lack of due diligence will 
continually increase.   The future of information assurance has already been addressed by 
a federal legislation.  Sean Doherty published email poll results regarding the impact of 
the newest federal initiatives in the July 2003 edition of Network Computing magazine.  
The survey indicated that 72% of survey respondents were directly affected by the 
legislative mandates.  “The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) hold affected enterprises accountable to 
protect private  information, meaning IT must assess the risks and implement appropriate 
safeguards” (Doherty, 2003).  Healthcare information losses resultant of ignoring the 
rules under HIPAA can cost up to $25,000 per violation.  Individual losses of personal 
information can cost financial institutions $1,000 per individual or up to $500,000 for a 
class of individuals who have not been afforded the appropriate protection mandated for 
them under the GLBA.   
Additionally, the Sarbane-Oxley Act of 2002 (SARBOX) mandates that any 
company issuing private securities maintain the appropriate controls of their financial 
reporting systems, as well as perform assessments of their systems’ controls and 
reporting those findings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The 
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SARBOX legislation can impose fiscal penalties up to $1 million as well as ten years’ 
imprisonment for a corporate officer that knowingly endorses a false financial report.  
As a part of the Federal Information Security Act of 2002 (FISMA), Congress is 
requiring the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop guidance 
for IT management safeguards that will adequately address the information assurance 
security triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems and their 
data elements.  NIST Special Publication 800-53 is expected to be finalized in the near 
future to detail required government entity controls by 2005, which will also include 
requirements for hardware and software maintenance.  The 238-page draft version is 
currently available for comment.  This document should be utilized in conjunction with 
two other NIST publications: the Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 
199: Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information 
Systems; and the NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for 
Federal Information Systems (Chabrow, 2003).  
The draft version of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, September 2002, 
also highlights the changes required to properly address existing deficiencies in 
information assurance practices.  On Tuesday, 3 December 2002 at the Computer System 
Security and Advisory Board Meeting, Richard Clarke, the Chair of the President’s 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board “…indicated that the real problem was not the 
lack of threat analysis but of a vulnerability analysis.” (Clarke, 2002).  According to the 
draft, a number of initiatives and practices will have to be adopted to protect information 
technology assets.  Among those items that pertain to this project, section R3-5 in the 
summary section is most applicable.  This section contends that “Federal agencies should 
continue to expand the use of automated, enterprise-wide security assessment  and 
security policy enforcement tools and actively deploy threat management tools to 
preempt attacks” (Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, 2002). 
If the information assurance initiatives to safeguard information assets can focus 
more on a holistic approach that addresses the security framework, specifically in the 
areas of policy, processes, personnel and products, a more recognizable sense of 
information security will be realized  (McGuirl, 2004).  
19 
H. INFORMATION ASSURANCE POLICY REQUIREMENTS 
This section identifies the source of privacy and security requirements for Federal 
automated information systems with which DoD and Naval Medicine must comply. 
Governing Federal privacy and security policy statements express fundamental privacy 
and security requirements and serve as a framework for developing more specific 
technical and administrative security specifications, design, and operational requirements.   
1.  Federal Requirements 
a. Privacy Act of 1974, P.L. 93-579, 5 U.S.C. 552a (1974)  
The Privacy Act requires federal agencies to safeguard personal data 
processed by automated information systems. This Act also requires the agencies to allow 
individuals to find out what personal information is being maintained and to correct 
inaccurate information. The Act identifies physical security procedures, information 
management practices, and computer and network controls for systems that process 
Privacy Act data.  
b. Computer Security Act of 1987 P.L. 100-235 (1988) 
The Computer Security Act, which went into effect in September 1988, 
requires every U.S. government computer system that processes sensitive information to 
have a customized security plan for the system's management and usage. It also requires 
all U.S. government employees, contractors, and others who directly affect federal 
programs undergo periodic training in computer security.  All users of systems containing 
sensitive data must also receive computer security training corresponding to the 
sensitivity of the data to which they have access.  
c. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
The Clinger-Cohen Act requires all federal government agency heads to 
design and implement IT management processes for maximizing the value and assessing 
and managing the risks of the IT acquisitions.  They are also directed to establish goals 
for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of agency operations through the effective 
use of IT.  With regards to information assurance, they ensure that the information 
security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency are adequate.  
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d. Management of Federal Information Resources (OMB Circular 
No. A-130, Appendix III, "Security of Federal Automated 
Information Systems", 1996  
OMB Circular No. A-130 Appendix III, revised in February 1996, stresses 
management controls, individual responsibility, accountability, and awareness and 
training, rather than technical controls.  Agencies must ensure that risk-based rules of 
behavior and operation are established, that employees are trained in them, and that the 
rules are enforced.  Specifically, it requires agencies to implement and maintain a 
program to ensure adequate security is provided for all agency information collected, 
processed, transmitted, stored, or disseminated in general support systems and major 
applications. Appendix III no longer requires a formal risk analysis. Instead, risk-based 
management is employed to address general risk assessments. Major risk-based 
management factors include: applications, threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguard 
effectiveness.  Lastly, each agency is required to work with OMB, NIST, and NSA to 
improve agency computer security.  
e. Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, 
Public Law 104-191 (HIPAA) 
 The HIPAA Security Rule specifically focuses on the safeguarding of 
electronic protected health information (EPHI). The main goal of the HIPAA Security 
Rule is to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected 
health information. The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) applies 
to all federal agencies and all information types, but the HIPAA requirement further 
refines the rules for use of EPHI. All Naval Medicine facilities and health care providers 
must comply with the HIPAA Security Rule, which establishes a set of security standards 
for securing certain health care information.  A health care provider is defined as any 
provider of medical or other health services, or supplies, which transmits any health 
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction for which a standard has 
been adopted. 
f. Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63), 1998 
This document recognizes that the United States maintains the world's 
strongest military as well as the largest national economy and that those aspects of our 
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power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. It also recognizes that each aspect is 
increasingly reliant on certain critical infrastructures and cyber-based information 
systems.  It further recognizes that although critical infrastructures had historically been 
physically and logically separate systems with little interdependence, they were 
increasingly dependent on information technology, and each other.  The increased 
automation and links between them also created new vulnerabilities to equipment failure, 
human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber attacks. The 
directive contends that addressing these vulnerabilities require flexible and evolutionary 
approaches for the public and private sectors.  Frequent assessments are made of critical 
infrastructures’ reliability, vulnerability and the threat environment because the threats to 
infrastructures will continue to change and protective measures and responses must be 
robust and adaptive. 
NSA is charged with the National Manager responsibilities and assesses 
U.S. Government systems for interception and exploitation, disseminates threat and 
vulnerability notices, establishes standards, and conducts research and development in 
areas of security product evaluations. 
g. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347) 
The E-Government Act of 2002 recognizes the importance of information 
security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. Title III of 
the E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information Security Management Act of 
2002 (FISMA), tasks NIST with the responsibility for standards and guidelines.  This 
includes development of the standards to be used by all federal agencies to categorize all 
information and information systems collected or maintained by each agency.  This is 
based on the objectives of providing appropriate levels of information assurance 
according to a range of risk levels and guidelines to recommend the types of information 
and information systems that should be included in each category 
h. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) 
FISMA directs federal agency heads and their Chief Information Officers 
(CIOs) to ensure that there is an information security program in place as well as trained 
personnel to administer the program. A great emphasis is placed on fully integrating 
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security into the existing and future business processes. Each management official, 
typically referred to as the Designated Approval Authority (DAA), is required to 
authorize each system for operation with a formal certification and accreditation (C&A) 
process. The certification and accreditation process is required on all federal information 
systems.  This process is intended to ensure that the appropriate security controls are 
implemented and are operating as intended. FISMA further requires that agency systems 
be certified and accredited to continue IT operations, which includes those federal 
systems subject to HIPAA compliance. 
Agency heads are responsible for providing information security 
protections regarding the magnitude and risk of harm resulting from unauthorized access, 
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of data or information systems. 
Requirements include periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information 
security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on 
risk, but no less than annually, to ensure that they are effectively implemented.  These 
procedures are required for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents, and 
are consistent with standards and guidelines, including the mitigation of risks associated 
with such incidents before substantial damage occurs. 
2. DoD Requirements 
a. DoD 5200.28-STD - Department Of Defense Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria.  
The DoD 5200.28-STD, paragraph 2.2.3.2.1 directs department heads to 
test security protection mechanisms to confirm they work as claimed in the system 
documentation and to search for obvious flaws that would allow the bypass of security 
mechanisms, permit a violation of resource isolation, and allow unauthorized access to 
the audit or authentication data 
b. DoD Instruction 8500.2 – Information Assurance (IA) 
Implementation 
DoD Instruction 8500.2, paragraph E3.3.10. requires each DoD 
component’s information assurance (IA) program to regularly and systematically assess 
their IA posture with regard to DoD component-level information systems, and the DoD 
component-wide IA services and supporting infrastructures via combinations of self-
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assessments, independent assessments and audits, formal testing and certification 
activities, host and network vulnerability testing, as well as IA program reviews. 
3. Command Requirements 
a.  Military Health System (MHS) Information Assurance (IA) 
Policy/Guidance Manual 
The provisions of this policy apply to all MHS components, military 
personnel, DoD civilians, and contractors, who manage, design, develop, operate, or 
access DoD information systems, and the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA)–
developed and operated information systems, or access DoD data.  MHS Components 
include: Service Medical Departments, TMA Directors, TMA Centrally Managed 
Systems, and TRICARE contractors. 
Risk assessments are to be conducted whenever significant and major 
changes occur or when new threats are identified to the DoD IS or the IS operating 
environment.  MHS Components are directed to attempt to exploit network security 
vulnerabilities using penetration testing during the C&A process, or more frequently as 
required by the MHS IA Program Office.  Penetration tests on DOD information systems 
will be conducted by the MHS IA Program Office, in coordination with the appropriate 
Service, to verify the adequacy of security countermeasures in place. 
Vulnerability Assessments performed on MHS Components will identify 
system and network vulnerabilities through use of vulnerability assessment tools. 
Vulnerability assessments are to be conducted on the network and critical servers and 
systems at least annually.  Additionally, the Systems Administrator (SA) and the 
Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) obtain and run vulnerability assessment 
software on automated information systems and networks monthly. 
The MHS Components will incorporate a comprehensive process to audit, 
detect, isolate, and react to intrusions, service disruptions, and incidents that threaten the 
security of operations.  Individual sites are required to review audit records for DOD 
information systems on a monthly basis or more frequently when deemed necessary.  
Continuous security monitoring will be performed within each MHS Component.  The 
information system owners will ensure the information systems they are responsible for 
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are regularly monitored, that system records are reviewed on a weekly basis, and that all 
DOD information systems are protected by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).   
b. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) Information 
Assurance Information Systems Security Policy Manual 
A primary function of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) is 
to ensure the National Command Authority has a healthy fighting force with a supporting 
combat-ready health care system. The inherent sensitivity of the BUMED healthcare 
information systems is ascertained by the concerns for individual privacy and the 
integrity of the personal and medical information processed, as well as the availability of 
the information systems that support the Navy’s health care programs.  
The BUMED Information Systems Security Program was  implemented to 
ensure required protective measures are implemented to protect BUMED information 
systems against unauthorized modification, disclosure, destruction, and denial of service 
throughout all system life cycle phases. The document establishes the security policy for 
protecting the data, services, and resources related to development, maintenance and 
operations involving the systems and networks in Claimancy 18 activities, which are 
comprised of approximately 400 commands.  Each system's level of security must protect 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information. Specifically, the 
document requires that each system undergoes periodic monitoring to test for known 
operating system vulnerabilities. It further recommends that every open port should be 
associated with a known application and that all other should be terminated and that 
regular monitoring of system logs for suspicious activity should be conduced. Finally, the 
policy recommends the use of available tools to periodically audit systems, especially 
servers, to ensure that there have been no unauthorized or unknown changes to the file 
system, registry, or user account database. 
4. Comparative Summary of Information Assurance Policies 
Table 4 below shows a comparison of the information assurance policies 
described above.  The Vulnerability Scanning Requirements column indicates how often 
vulnerability assessments are required, at a minimum.  Per the background information 
reviewed in this chapter, none of the minimum requirements are sufficient in today’s 
networked computing environment, as the window between new threats decreases.   
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Policy  Vulnerability 
Scanning 
Requirement 
Valid in Current 
Operating 
Environment 
Federal   
Computer Act of 1987 None No 
Privacy Act of 1974 None No 
HIPAA Periodic  No 
FISMA Annually  No 
OMB Circular A-130 None No 
PDD 63 Frequently  No 
DoD   
DoD 8500.2 Regularly No 
Organizational   
MHS Monthly No 
BUMED Periodically No 
Table 2. Comparative Summary of Information Assurance Policies 
After a thorough review of the aforementioned policies and directives, it can be 
concluded that the MHS policy is the most stringent attempt made to require Naval 
Medicine activities to properly address or meet the current information assurance threats.  
The overarching policies are vague at best and should be revised as soon as feasible.  
Retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation for the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense stated that “…trends, which futurists call ‘perfectly 
predictable surprises’ – when the rate of transactions exceeds the resources, then policy 
will change – are already showing, and aiming toward networks and networking 
behavior”( Roosevelt, 2004).  As task loads continue to increase, IT managers will have 
to voice their concerns about the technical issues confronting them.  Alerting policy 
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makers, managers and strategists are parts of the solution (Azari, 2003).  Without the 
awareness of an ever-increasing responsibility, management may never know what is 
required.  MHS and will and can assist in evaluating network security assessments, but 
coordinating and scheduling full scale network security audits may take some time as the 
technical experts on staff to perform such task is limited in number. 
I. DEFENDING YOUR INFORMATION ASSETS  
1. Awareness Training 
a. Continuing Education 
Continuing education is a must in information technology.  New systems 
hardware, software, user features and enhanced capabilities continue to alter our 
connected world, and technology continues to push the boundaries of physics and space.  
Continuing education does not necessarily mean that increases in training budgets are 
required.  There are a number of free vendor seminars and publications that yield 
significant amounts of information security-related training.  John Saunders has provided 
an excellent Web page at http://www.johnsaunders.com/security.htm that maintains a 
plethora of information security topics.  Table 3 displays the key categories found on that 
page.  
 
Table 3. Computer Security Links  
Federal Computer Weekly often has current IT news and trends that are 
relative to the U. S. Federal Government. Although the title is misleading, this resource is 
a commercial entity.  URL: http://www.fcw.com/links/legislation/techleg.asp  
The U.S. Government also hosts many helpful links.  The following are 
among the more prevalent resource materials available online. 
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (URL: 
http://www.nist.gov/) is a repository of laws, statutes, acts, Executive Orders, and 
multiple policies concerning information technology issues relevant to the federal 
government. 
The Office of Homeland Security, The White House (URL: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland) is the newest department in the Executive Branch 
that possesses the teeth to affect information technology components and processes.  
The Sixty-Minute Network Security Guide (First Steps Toward a Secure 
Network Environment) was published by the Systems and Network Attack Center 
(SNAC) of the National Security Agency. An E-mail request should be sent to 
SNAC.Guides@nsa.gov for the current URL of this valuable tool. 
The Defense Information Systems Agency is another valuable site that 
should not be overlooked.  The Information Support Environment link 
http://iase.disa.mil/eta/ provides free video and training/tutorial CDs on some of the 
hottest topics in information security today.  The information assurance videos are great 
for the required annual information security refresher training. 
A number of other informative sites are available for researching 
vulnerabilities and threats that have been identified for specific systems and services.  
They can be reviewed at the following sites: 
• Security Focus www.securityfocus.com  
• Incidents.org www.incidents.org  
• InfoSysSec www.infosyssec.com  
• Packet Storm www.packetstormsecurity.org   
b. Annual Training 
Annual training is a reminder to all organizational personnel that security 
is an individual responsibility.  Not all personnel are security engineers, but the basics 
should always be included in such training.  This include, but are not limited to social 
engineering methods, which remains one of the most effective methods that attackers 
utilize to gain access to an organization’s information assets; password management, 
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locking system desktops, reporting suspicious activity or system files including 
unsolicited email attachments. 
c. Professional Training 
Professional training is not for everyone, but a number of organizations 
provide information security training programs and certifications.  Some are vendor-
specific and others operate as a non-profit organization.  Most professional certifications 
require a test and/or practical demonstration of knowledge in a wide range of domain-
specific areas of information security.  Some of the most recognized security 
certifications are: 
Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) – Visit 
http://www.isc2.org for additional information. 
System Administration, Networking, and Security (SANS) – Visit 
http://www.sans.org/ for additional information.   
Vendor-specific: 
Cisco certifications are organized in 3 major categories; Associate, 
Professional, and Expert levels of expertise.  Visit http://cisco.netacad.net/public/ for  
additional information. 
  Microsoft Certifications are arranged for systems administrators, 
application developers, solutions developers, systems engineers, and database 
administrators. Additional details can be found at Microsoft’s Web site, located at  
http://www.microsoft.com/education/msitacademy/WorldWide/Default.aspx . 
d. Experience-based 
Education can only be supplemented by time and experience.  Although 
experienced security personnel have existing certifications, continued training is required 
to expand their knowledge base current.  More experienced personnel should be 
scheduled for advanced training whenever feasible. 
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2. Vulnerability Assessments 
a. Purpose 
Vulnerability assessments are an effective way to identify potential 
vulnerabilities in a system or network. These exercises of security evaluation usually 
employ common attack methods that an adversary may use in an attempt to access 
information systems of interest. These methods may range from a simple IP scan to 
identifying resources that utilize services with known vulnerabilities or unpatched 
systems for future exploits.  The end goal of vulnerability assessments is to report system 
weaknesses to the owner for resolution or to the attacker for a future exploit. 
Vulnerability assessments are performed for a number of reasons, but they 
are not considered a simple task and usually require special knowledge to perform.  Fears 
of corrupting or breaking existing systems are generally the reason they are not a standard 
inter-organizational practice.  They are normally composed of multiple rather than one 
aggressive attack methods and when they are performed, it is done when activity periods 
are slow as the networked systems or the network as a whole can be disabled during the 
process.  Vulnerability assessments are often performed during certification and 
accreditation assessments or whenever a test of organizational intrusion detection and 
response capabilities are desired.  
b. External 
External vulnerability assessments originate from the platform on which a 
true adversary would likely attack from.  This type of attack tests the abilities of the 
firewall and router filtering capabilities, all the systems that are accessible from the 
outside, such as web and mail servers, as well as gateway-specific controls that may 
assist to block such attempts.  These types of tests are seldom performed due to the 
complexity and legal situations that may arise from such vulnerability assessments, 
especially in DoD networks, where other entities outside of the organization may be 
monitoring network activities.  External attack scenarios take a considerable amount of 
coordination by all parties concerned.  
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c. Internal 
Internal vulnerability assessments are better managed within specified 
boundaries of the network.  These attacks can be directed at a network segment more 
easily and consume less resources in the process.  Tests of network segments are less 
costly, more controlled, and safer to perform in regards to network stability.  
d. Network Surveys  
Network surveys promote a more comprehensive method of testing the 
overall security posture of a network.  These foot printing and scanning exercises provide 
an insight to determining which resources are available for testing purposes.  Mapping or 
surveying most generally yields domain names, server names, Internet service provider 
information, Internet protocol (IP) addresses of individual hosts, and their interconnecting 
devices.  The Nmap tool is very effective for this type of discovery.  Nmap can 
differentiate which operating systems are running on a network as well as the types of 
packet filters or firewalls are in use. Additional details can be found by visiting the Nmap 
hyperlink posted in Table 7. 
e. Limitations of Vulnerability Assessments  
If vulnerability assessments are going to be initiated to simulate a real 
attack, they should be conducted as "black box" exercises.  In a real attack, the attacking 
agent would not normally possess intimate information about the system being tested. 
Knowing about the system specifics would actually invalidate the test before it could 
begin.  It is easy to imagine that an attacker already knowing administrator passwords 
and how your network was configured would not really be testing anything except for 
their personal skills.  A simulated attack will only identify the problems that it is designed 
to look for.  If the tools are not configured to seek a system feature or service, it will not 
produce any information about its level of security or insecurity.  It is also important to 
remember that vulnerability assessments would seldom, if ever, provide information 
about vulnerabilities that have not yet been discovered and well documented within the 
security community (one must know the “signature” of what they are looking for… few, 
if any, heuristic tools are available in this area).  Furthermore, if there are no instances 
where vulnerabilities are identified after the vulnerability assessment is complete, it does 
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not necessarily mean that a network is secure.  Assessments are a “snap-shot” in time, 
and can become obsolete within days as new vulnerabilities are discovered by 
information assurance professionals.  If vulnerabilities are discovered, as they often are, it 
is imperative that the corrective configuration settings and or patches are applied as soon 
as possible.  The effort required to remediate vulnerabilities can be quite substantial.  
More often than not, a vulnerability report collects dust before corrective actions are 
implemented, which often means that more vulnerabilities have likely been reported and 
the system will not be any more secure after the earlier noted changes are applied.  It 
must be remembered that one vulnerable platform is all that an attacker needs to 
influence a network operating environment.   
f. Unexpected Consequences Derived From Testing 
Vulnerability assessments can have serious consequences for the network 
on which they are run.  If badly conducted it can cause congestion and systems crashing.  
It is, therefore, vital to have consent from the management of an organization before 
conducting vulnerability assessments on its systems or network.  If the issue of timing is 
not resolved properly, it could be catastrophic to an organization.  Imagine conducting a 
denial-of-service ‘test’ on a university on the day its students take their online 
examinations.  This is an example of poor timing as well as lack of communication 
between the vulnerability assessors and the university.  Good planning and preparation 
will help avoid such bad practices. 
3. Automated Tools 
a. DoD Approved 
Government off-the-shelf (GOTS) vulnerability scanning software is 
available from the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) at no cost to all 
government agencies.  There are two versions of Security Profile Inspector (SPI), for 
Windows NT (SPI-NT) operating systems and for Unix Networks (SPI-NET).  Both 
versions can be retrieved from: http://www.cert.mil/resources/security_tools.htm 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offers another no-cost 
service to federal agencies.  Patch Authentication and Dissemination Capability (PADC) 
is a service that allows agencies to retrieve information on trusted and authenticated 
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patches for their specific operating systems.  Subscriptions must be requested from the 
DHS’s Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC).  Of the 2000 accounts 
available, only 47 agencies had active subscriptions as of 10 September 2003.  Other 
patch management solutions may offer expanded capabilities, but they are not free of 
charge. 
b. Non-DoD Approved 
A recent study published on 26 June 2003 by Kevin Novak provides a 
great level of detail in regards to vulnerability assessment scanners.  The study examined 
11 of the most prevalent vulnerability assessment scanners on the market.  The features, 
capabilities, company information, and costs associated with those systems are listed in 




Table 4. Vulnerability-Assessment Tools: Vendors at a Glance 
From http://www.nwc.com/1412/1412f2.html 
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Table 6. Vulnerability-Assessment Tools: Report Card. 
http://www.nwc.com/1412/1412f213.html 
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c. Vulnerability Assessment Tools 
There are a great number of other tools available that are designed to 
automatically discover vulnerabilities.  Nessus is a scaning utility that remains a favorite 
among attackers and can be found at http://www.nessus.org.  Nessus possesses the 
capability of remotely auditing a network and reporting the existing vulnerabilities.  A 
short abbreviated list of other commonly used tools with a brief description of their 
capabilities is provided below. 
1) Information Gathering Tools:  
• Nmap – Network and port scanner with operating 
system discover   
• Hping – Port scanning tool 
• Netcat – Obtains service banners and versions  
• Firewalk – Useful for determining a firewall access 
control list (ACL)  
• Ethereal – Useful for monitoring and logging traffic 
returning from maps and scans 
• Icmpquery – Used to determine target systems time 
and network mask used to hide real addresses  
• Strobe – A useful port scanning utility 
• Superscan – A Windows port scanning tool 
• RPCDump- Command line tool that performs 
queries on Remote Procedure Call (RPC) endpoints   
• Netstat – Shows active TCP connections, open 
ports, Ethernet statistics, and the IP routing table 
The Foundstone Company is another free defense resource site that also 
offers a comprehensive list of tools for security risk management and vulnerability 
assessments. The tools offered freely to the public are the ones used in the field by its 
consultants. Visit them at http://www.foundstone.com/ and click the resources link to 
view the available tools. 
Another type or method of vulnerability assessment involves password 
breaking, also referred to as password cracking.  Again, these are automated tools that are 
simple to use and are limited only by processing power.  Even on standard use personal 
computers, a password cracking utility can process more than 100,000 guesses per 
second.  One of these utilities is especially effective against passwords required for 
remote access systems allowing Telnet and FTP transfers, since it does not require the 
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password file off a computer, as do the first three mentioned below. The following lists a 
few of the password cracking methods and tools used today. 
• Dictionary Attack – Uses a word list or dictionary file and can be modified to 
incorporate multiple languages.  One standard dictionary attack takes a few 
minutes to test every word.  It is a fast method that is often very effective where 
password policies are not enforced. 
• Hybrid Crack - Tests for passwords that are variations of the words in a 
dictionary file.  It consumes more time, but yields more results. 
• Brute Force – This method uses a variety of tests for passwords that are made 
up of characters and numbers by performing every combination possible.  This 
method is most effective and will break anything given enough time, time being 
the key ingredient.  A password of eight characters or more could take from days 
to millions of years to crack.  
• Brutus- This tool is used to automatically crack telnet and ftp accounts.  Fast, 
effective method to demonstrate to management why those types of remote access 
are not a novel idea any longer.  Brutus is not included in Table 4, but is available 
at http://www.hoobie.net/brutus 
Please refer to Table 7 for additional tools that grant access and escalation 
of privilege.  L0phtcrack and John the Ripper are two of the most appropriate tools for 
password cracking. 
d. Tools and Information Available to the General Public 
Table 7 is a brief compilation of tools available to network defenders and 
attackers to determine where an organization’s strength and weaknesses are, created by 
the authors of  the “Hacking Exposed” series of books.    














Locator http://www.netwarefiles.com/utils/hobjloc.zip  
Ippl http://www.via.ecp.fr/~hugo/ippl/  
ITA from Axent http://www.axent.com 
Kane Security 
Monitor http://www.intrusion.com 




Protolog) http://www.grigna.com/diego/linux/protolog/index.html  
Psionic Portsentry 







Scanlogd http://www.openwall.com/scanlogd/  
Secured by 
Memco http://www.memco.com 










Portfuck http://www.stargazer.net/~flatline/filez/portfuck.zip  
Smurf & Fraggle http://www.rootshell.com/archive-j457nxiqi3gq59dv/199710/smurf.c.html  http://www.rootshell.com/archive-j457nxiqi3gq59dv/199803/fraggle.c.html  










Enumeration Tools  
Bindery http://www.nmrc.org/files/netware/bindery.zip  
Bindin ftp://ftp.edv-himmelbauer.co.at/Novell.3x/TESTPROG/BINDIN.EXE  
Epdump http://www.ntshop.net/security/tools/def.htm  
Finger ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/.1/novell/finger.zip  
Legion ftp://ftp.technotronic.com/rhino9-products/legion.zip  
NDSsnoop ftp://ftp.iae.univ-poitiers.fr/pc/netware/UTIL/ndssnoop.exe  
NetBios Auditing Tool 
(NAT) ftp://ftp.technotronic.com/microsoft/nat10bin.zip  
Netcat by Hobbit http://www.l0pht.com/~weld/netcat/  
Netviewx http://www.ibt.ku.dk/jesper/NTtools/  
Nslist http://www.nmrc.org/files/snetware/nut18.zip  
On-Site Admin ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/.1/novell/onsite.zip  
Snlist ftp://ftp.it.ru/pub/netware/util/NetWare4.Toos/snlist.exe  
Somarsoft (dumpacl, 
dumpreg, etc.) http://38.15.19.115/ 
user2sid and sid2user http://www.chem.msu.su:8080/~rudnyi/NT/sid.txt  
Userdump ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/.1/novell/userdump.zip  
Userinfo ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/.1/novell/userinfo.zip  
Footprinting Tools  
ARIN database http://www.arin.net/whois/ 
Cyberarmy http://www.cyberarmy.com 
Dogpile (meta search engine) http://www.dogpile.com 
DomTools (axfr) http://www.domtools.com/pub/domtools1.4.0.tar.gz  
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Ferretsoft http://www.ferretsoft.com 
Sam Spade http://www.samspade.org 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) http://www.sec.gov/ 
USENET Searching http://www.deja.com  http://www.dogpile.com 
VisualRoute http://www.visualroute.com 
WHOIS database http://www.networksolutions.com 
WS_ Ping Pack Pro http://www.ipswitch.com 





Tool (NAT) ftp://ftp.technotronic.com/microsoft/nat10bin.zip  
Nwpcrack http:www.nmrc.org/files/netware/nwpcrack.zip  
SMBgrind by NAI Included with CyberCop Scanner from Network Associates (http://www.nai.com) 
Sniffit http://newdata.box.sk/neworder/a/sniffit.0.3.2.tar.gz  
SNMPsniff http://www.AntiCode.com/archives/network-sniffers/snmpsniff-1_0.tgz 
THC login/telnet http://thc.pimmel.com/files/thc/thc-lh11.zip  
Privilege Escalation and Back Door Tools  
Elitewrap http://www.multimania.com/trojanbuster/elite.zip  
Getadmin http://www.ntsecurity.net/security/getadmin.htm  
Hunt http://www.cri.cz/kra/index.html#HUNT  
Imp http://www.wastelands.gen.nz/ 
Invisible Keystroke Logger http://www.amecisco.com/iksnt.htm  
Jcmd http://www.jrbsoftware.com 
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Pandora by NMRC http://www.nmrc.org/pandora/download.html  
Pwdump2 http://www.Webspan.net/~tas/pwdump2/  
Revelation by Snadboy http://www.snadboy.com 
Sechole http://www.ntsecurity.net/security/sechole.htm  
SNMPsniff http://packetstorm.harvard.edu/sniffers/snmpsniff-1.0.tar.gz
Unhide http://www.Webdon.com 
Virtual Network Computing 
(VNC) http://www.uk.research.att.com/vnc  
Pilfering  
File Wrangler http://www.tucows.com 
PowerDesk's ExplorerPlus http://www.mijenix.com/powerdesk98.asp  
Revelation http://www.snadboy.com 
Rootkits and Cover Tracks  
Cygwin Win32 (cp and touch 
commands) http://www.cygnus.com 
Wipe ftp://ftp.technotronic.com/unix/log-tools/wipe-1.00.tgz  
Zap ftp://ftp.technotronic.com/unix/log-tools/zap.c  
Scanning Tools  
BindView http://www.bindview.com 
Chknull http://www.nmrc.org/files/netware/chknull.zip  
CyberCop Scanner by NAI http://www.nai.com 
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Firewalk http://www.packetfactory.net/firewalk/  
Fping http://packetstorm.harvard.edu/ 
HackerShield by Bindview http://www.bindview.com/netect 
Hping http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/ 
InspectorScan by Shavlik http://www.shavlik.com 
Internet Scanner by ISS http:/www.iss.net 
Kane Security Analyst http://www.intrusion.com 
Network Mapper (Nmap) http://www.insecure.org/nmap 
NTInfoscan http://www.infowar.co.uk/mnemonix/  




Udpscan ftp://ftp.technotronic.com/unix/network-scanners/udpscan.c  
WebTrends Security 
Analyzer by WebTrends http://www.Webtrends.com 
WS_Ping Pack Pro http://www.ipswitch.com 
War Dialing Tools  
PhoneSweep by Sandstorm http://www.sandstorm.net 
THC http://www.infowar.co.uk/thc/ 
ToneLoc http://www.hackersclub.com/km/files/pfiles/Tl110.zip 
Table 7. Network Defense and Attack Tools and Links  
From http://www.hackingexposed.com/tools/tools.html. 
 
4. Proactive Measures 
a. Systems Configuration 
Vulnerability scanners will alert system owners of potential weaknesses 
within their information system, but maintaining the appropriate systems configuration 
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alleviates many of the vulnerabilities found in unmanaged systems. Applications and 
services required to operate the system should be evaluated to determine which ports and 
protocols are required for functionality.  All unused ports and services should be 
terminated.  Many of the findings that are derived from vulnerability assessments address 
unnecessary open port and service issues.  The majority of applications and operating 
systems on the market today are loaded with default settings focused on providing the 
customer with all available services included in the software.  Many of those services 
installed by default are never required and place the system at a higher level of risk as 
soon as it is connected to the Internet. 
NIST has produced a number of Special Publications to assist in 
information assurance tasks.  The following table is referenced in the draft version of 
NIST SP 800-66, An Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule.  This is a great 
resource in its entirety.  Appendix E has an extensive HIPAA Security Rule/FISMA 
requirements crosswalk table that breaks down every element required for compliance 
with the federal mandates.  See Table 8 for a quick review of what NIST has to offer. 
NIST Publication  Title  
FIPS 140-2  Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules  
FIPS 199  Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 
Information and Information Systems  
NIST SP 800-12  An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST 
Handbook  
NIST SP 800-14  Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for 
Securing Information Technology Systems  
NIST SP 800-16  Information Technology Security Training 
Requirements: A Role- And Performance-Based 
Model  
NIST SP 800-18  Guide for Developing Security Plans for 
Information Technology Systems  
NIST SP 800-26  Security Self-Assessment Guide for Information 
Technology Systems  
NIST SP 800-27  Engineering Principles for Information 
Technology Security (A Baseline for Achieving 
Security)  
NIST SP 800-30  Risk Management Guide for Information 
Technology Systems  
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NIST SP 800-34  Contingency Planning Guide for Information 
Technology Systems.  
NIST SP 800-35  Guide to Information Technology Security 
Services  
NIST SP 800-36  Guide to Selecting Information Security 
Products  
NIST SP 800-37  Guide for the Security Certification and 
Accreditation of Federal Information Systems  
NIST SP 800-42  Guideline on Network Security Testing  
NIST SP 800-44  Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers  
NIST SP 800-47  Security Guide for Interconnecting Information 
Technology Systems  
NIST SP 800-50  Building Information Technology Security 
Awareness and Training Program  
NIST SP 800-53  Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems  
NIST SP 800-55  Security Metrics Guide for Information 
Technology Systems  
NIST SP 800-56  Recommendation on Key Establishment 
Schemes  
NIST SP 800-57  Recommendation on Key Management  
NIST SP 800-59  Guideline for Identifying an Information System 
as a National Security System  
NIST SP 800-60  Guide for Mapping Types of Information and 
Information Systems to Security Categories  
NIST SP 800-61  Computer Security Incident Handling Guide  
NIST SP 800-63  Recommendation for Electronic Authentication  
NIST SP 800-64  Security Considerations in the Information 
System Development Life Cycle  
Table 8. NIST Publications Referenced in NIST SP 800-664  
Figure 4 illustrates how the NIST publications relate to the essential 
elements for creating and managing an information assurance security program. 
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Figure 4.   NIST Publications  
J. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO NAVAL MEDICINE 
1. Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) Implications 
a. Maintenance for Non-Qualifying Systems 
Although the NMCI initiative will assume operations for the majority of 
systems with the Navy and Marine Corps, and therefore the security associated with 
them, some exceptions to the assumption of individual networks will occur.  Many of the 
legacy programs will not meet the required certification and accreditation status needed 
to operate on the NMCI network.  Until they are replaced or incorporated into other 
qualifying systems, the need to manage those systems vulnerabilities will remain a 
requirement.    
2. Greater Assurance of Due Diligence in Personal Privacy Issues 
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Federal legislation has recently mandated that executive staff members, especially 
the Commanding officers of those organizations, are responsible for the safekeeping of 
personal data stored on information systems.  Ignoring that responsibility may require 
that their negligence be penalized with significant fines and/or imprisonment.  An 
effective patch management program will more likely demonstrate due diligence should a 
compromise occur than would having none at all.  
3. Estimated Savings in Personnel Costs 
Gartner group estimates that a 1000-unit server farm costs $300,000 per year to 
perform patch management tasks.  The same server population would cost $50,000 to 
implement an automated solution (Schroder et al, 2003).  This question will be covered in 
greater detail in  Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations.   
4. Significant Reductions in Vulnerabilities 
The overall benefit derived from performing continuous vulnerability assessments 
across the entire network will not only alert administrators of existing weaknesses, but 
will save them numerous hours in reconfiguration efforts required to recover from 
compromised systems.  When considering the legal responsibilities facing organizations 
in today’s network-centric environment, can anyone really afford to leave their systems 
unprotected?  According to Security Alert Consensus www.sans.org/newsletters/sac, 
there are approximately 1000 new operating systems and applications vulnerabilities  















III. RESEARCH METHODS 
A. WORK PLAN 
This project utilizes an applied research methodology, including both primary and 
secondary research.  This research is limited to Naval Medicine personnel who are 
directly responsible for information systems operations.   
B. SECONDARY 
Secondary research was obtained from online sources, including the World Wide 
Web and the Dudley Knox Library archives at Naval Postgraduate School.  These efforts 
confirm the current technologies utilized by other information-centric organizations and 
seek the most effective employment techniques (scheduling, automation, etc.).  
Interviews with industry and government information assurance professionals aid in 
determining a return on investment, should the recommended policies and practices be 
accepted. 
C. PRIMARY 
The primary research begins with an evaluation of the current Naval Medicine 
network vulnerability management policy and practices.  A comparison to Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and other federal/service policies is 
reviewed to confirm or recommend current policy modification.  In addition to policy 
review, the information assurance (IA) methodologies suggested by NSA will be 
recommended, if applicable, to enhance existing IA practices.  A Web-based survey 
seeking general information in regards to IA policy, known systems compromises, 
current vulnerability scanning methods, and patching practices will be posted on the 
Naval Medicine Intranet portal referred to as Naval Medicine Online (NMO).  The results 
provide insight into the effects of current policy, tools and techniques used by 
information technology managers utilized to protect information system assets.  
Submitted survey responses are anonymous and solely intended to survey current policy 
practices, overarching policy adherence and current vulnerability assessment practices.    
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D. SURVEY INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
The survey instrument is designed for comprehensibility to all participants while 
capturing the information necessary to validate or invalidate the premise: Seventy-five 
percent of Naval Medicine’s known information systems compromises were not 
protected by the available vulnerability patch(es).  The survey is compiled with an All-
Points-Anchored response option for each of 30 questions.  Response options for 
Questions 5 through 30 will be coded as 1 through 4 for statistical analysis.  The survey 
development tool within the Naval Medicine Online portal will be utilized to create an 
HTML-based survey.  A survey key, generated and delivered to each Naval Medicine 
CIO, ensured that only one survey was submitted by each organization.  An emphasis in 
creating a short, easy-to-understand instrument was utilized to encourage participation 
and to facilitate ease in completion.  Each of the 30 questions has supplemental 
descriptors for clarification.  Additionally, each question was placed in a logical 
progression, while a best effort approach was made to keep response categories as close 
as possible to similar response categories.  Respondents were instructed to select one 
response for each applicable question.  
The survey instrument displayed four response sections in a linear table format.  
The first portion of the survey, Questions 1 through 4, was used for demographic analysis 
that included title, years of experience, size of organization and generalized geographic 
location.   
The second area, Questions 9 through 14, inquire about information system 
certification and accreditation concerns, vulnerability scanning, and patch management 
practices.  Similar surveys regarding these topics were sought during secondary research 
efforts, but were not available.  Therefore, the survey questions were developed from a 
review of the literature available regarding information security, current technological 
advances, and interviews with Information Security professors at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  The response options vary somewhat, but the selection of responses are limited 
to four choices ranging from Yes, No, Planned, and Don’t Know throughout this section. 
The third section consisted of Questions 15 through 24, which seeks information 
regarding known system compromises, number of personnel available to perform 
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maintenance, and average number of hours spent performing maintenance and/ or 
restoration efforts.  The response options vary somewhat with numerical response options 
that are ranges of approximation.  It was perceived that an exact accounting of previous 
incidents may have deterred survey participation survey. 
Section Four is reserved for Questions 25 through 30, separated because they 
yield a wide variety of response options.  Further, survey respondents were cautioned 
regarding the dissimilarities in response options.  This section seeks information 
regarding information asset totals, personnel strengths, and personal opinions. 
Fellow students enrolled in the information security track within the Information 
Systems Technology curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School were selected to edit 
the survey instrument before pre-testing.  Afterwards, the survey was submitted for pre-
testing to the Naval Postgraduate School Chief Information Officer (CIO), Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO), Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO), and 
Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) to average the total survey participation 
time and to solicit any noted discrepancies or potential conflicts within the survey.  Their 
input had a two-fold benefit:  a test of the survey instrument for readability and allowance 
for editing without eliminating potential respondents from the pool of professionals 
within Naval Medicine.  
Prior to distributing the survey, the NMO portal manager at Naval Medical 
Information Management Center, Bethesda, Maryland, was contacted to request 
permission to distribute the survey instrument.  Once permission was received, potential 
respondents were contacted via the global address book on the Naval Medicine domain 







































IV. RESEARCH FINDING AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The small number of Naval Medicine CIOs available for this study required 
utilization of a similar group to pre-test the survey questionnaire.  The survey 
questionnaire for this study was pre-tested by fellow students enrolled in the information 
security track within the Information Systems Technology curriculum at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Afterwards, the survey was submitted for pre-testing to the Naval 
Postgraduate School CIO, CTO, ISSO, and ISSM to average the total survey participation 
time and to solicit any noted discrepancies or potential conflicts within the survey.  The 
average time to complete the 30-question survey was approximately 12 minutes.  Pre-test 
questionnaires are located in Appendix B.  Following the pre-test, questionnaires were 
transformed to an HTML-based survey and were activated on the Naval Medicine Online 
portal.  Finally, each of the 51 identified Naval Medicine CIOs was sent a survey key via 
email with an accompanying message to explain the purpose of the survey.   
B. DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 
Naval Medicine employs approximately 60,000 military, civilian and contract 
personnel to support medical and dental facilities, health care support offices, research 
and development activities and training commands around the world.  The information 
technology components of approximately 300 facilities are currently managed by 51 
CIOs.  A total of 51 survey invitations were sent out for participation in this research 
effort and 31 anonymously completed surveys were posted to the database.  The 
anonymous respondent survey data is located in Appendix D.  Twenty-six (84 percent) of 
the survey respondents were located in the continental United States (Inconus) and five 
(16 percent) of the survey respondents were located outside of the continental United 
States.  See Figure 5.  This sample size represents approximately 61 percent of the CIOs 









Figure 5.   Regional Survey Response 
 
There were 27 CIOs, three ISSMs, and one respondent categorized as “Other” that 
made up the representative sample of survey respondents.  See Figure 6.  The CIOs made 
up approximately 88 percent of the sample, the ISSMs made up another 9 percent of the 
population and one survey respondent was listed as “Other” for a job title that accounted 










Figure 6.   Survey Respondent Titles 
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This researcher attempted to make a distinction in facility size by incorporating 
ranges of total personnel strength per facility to classify each as a small, medium, or large 
facility.  Thirteen percent of the respondents were responsible for facilities with more 
than 1000 personnel within their organization. Fifty-five percent of the respondents were 
responsible for medium-sized facilities ranging from 201 to 1000 personnel.  The other 








Figure 7.   Respondent Organization Size (Personnel Strength) 
 
Seventy-one percent of the sample had eight or more years of IT experience.  
There were no respondents with less than 2 years of experience.  See Figure 8.  Only 10 
















Figure 8.   Respondent Years of Experience 
C. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS 
The standard deviation and confidence levels at 95% were computed for all 
questions.  See Appendix F.  Standard deviation remains one of the most commonly used 
statistical tools in the sciences and social sciences. It provides a precise measure of the 
amount of variation in any group of numbers.  A standard deviation is the plus or minus 
variance from the mean score needed to capture 68 percent of the population.  More 
generally, it is a number that distinguishes how far a particular field of data varies from 
the overall average of all respondents that answered a particular question. The smaller the 
deviation, the more confidence one can have in the computed value for the mean.  An 
extreme deviation was not noted in this survey.  Question 26 (“How many months pass 
between each systems vulnerability/penetration test?”) had the highest standard deviation 
at 1.362890, and Question 16 (How many system compromises were considered as 
serious?) had the lowest standard deviation at 0.358568.  Those figures are represented in 
Appendix G. 
A comparison of survey questions 15 (“How many known systems compromises, 
including e-mail and Web-based deliveries of malware, have occurred within your 
organization in the past year?”) and 17 (“How many of the compromises may have been 
prevented if the available patches had been installed?”) revealed that of the 14 commands 
reporting known compromises, seven of them reported that the available vulnerability 
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patches had not been applied.  Fifty percent of the attacks occurred on unpatched 
systems.  The survey did not request specific numbers of known attacks; however, it 
requested a general range of known attacks (See Appendix A, Question 15).  On the 
conservative side, that total equates to as little as 31 known attacks and at the other end of 
the response category spectrum, it equates to as many as 72 known attacks in the past 12 
months.  Along with this data, it should also be noted that 77 percent of those 
compromised systems were at commands within the continental United States (Inconus), 
while the remaining 23 percent were outside the continental United States (Outconus).  
This finding correlates to the findings in Burns (2003), whereas the majority of attacks 
are directed at the United States. 
One would tend to believe that years of experience would make a difference in the 
frequency of attacks.  The demographics portion of the survey inquired about the 
respondent’s years of IT experience.  Once again, this area of the survey did not request 
specific numbers of years; however, it requested a general range of years of experience.  
(See Appendix A, Question 4).  An across-the-board conservative approach, awarding no 
more that 8 years of IT experience to any one person, revealed that the average IT 
experience level for those compromised commands is 6.76 years.  This average could 
indicate that some of the CIOs in the field are short on either personnel or resources given 
that they have a adequate amount of IT experience. 
Question 25 inquired about the number of personnel resources employed 
specifically to perform system configuration and patch management tasks.  Question 28 
asked if enough resources were available to meet the current security threat.  Eight (57%) 
of the 14 sites reporting compromises reported they had the appropriate resources. Of 
those 14 sites that experienced system compromises, nine (64%) of them had one or more 
personnel performing that duty.  The other five sites that were compromised did not have 
personnel assigned specifically to perform patch management tasks, but five (83%) had 
someone performing those tasks as a part of their responsibility.  Since 13 of the 14 
(93%) of the compromised sites have someone performing the tasks in some capacity, 
this could indicate that the current patch management tasks are not being performed as 
quickly, or as thoroughly. as necessary to prevent the compromises as other tasks may be 
taking precedence.   
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Question 26 asked how many months pass between each systems vulnerability 
test.  The cumulative average of all compromised commands is 6.3 months between 
systems scans, while those that were not compromised average 4.6 months between 
vulnerability scans.  This supports Nicolett and Pescatore’s theory (2003) that although 
malware and bugs may take 6 months to become a problem, more frequent scanning will 
have an important effect on network management.  At a minimum, Military Health 
System Information Assurance Policy (2003) recommends system vulnerability scans at 
least once per month. Gartner research predicts that by the year 2005, just 6 months from 
now, “… the due diligence level of vulnerability assessment will require that full system 
scans be done at least once per month (.07 probability).”  Naval Medicine, as indicated by 
the IA survey results, is far behind the requirement for monthly scans, which if performed 
as prescribed, would have eliminated a significant amount of intrusions.  Depending on 
the size of the organization, automated methods of scanning may increase effectiveness, 
while simultaneously decreasing the overall risk.     
An insight to scanning and patching practices was discovered in Questions 10 
through 13.  Question 10 asked if automated vulnerability scans were performed.  
Eighteen (58%) commands reported that automated scans are done, while the remaining 
13 (42%) reported that they did not perform them.  Question 11 was the follow-on to 
Question 10, as it inquired about how many commands are utilizing automated patching 
technologies.  Twenty-five (81%) reported that they did, and only six (19%) reported that 
they did not.  This is interesting, to say the least if when considering the number of know 
compromises over the past 12 months.  Those reporting automated patching may be 
indicating that their servers are only performing automated vendor downloads and 
updates, as are available now on many of the Microsoft and Unix operating systems.  
Question 12 asked if manual vulnerability scans were performed.  Nineteen (61%) 
commands reported that manual scans are done and the remaining 12 (39%) reported that 
they did not perform them.  Of all respondents surveyed, 14 (45%) of them are 
performing scans within the 1-3 month timeframe, and it becomes evident at this point 
that frequency of scans and remediation has the greatest impact in regards to compromise 
prevention.  Only 4 (29%) of the 14 respondents have reported having systems 
compromises within the past year.  Question 13 was the follow-on to Question 12, 
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inquiring as to how many commands are utilizing manual patching technologies.  
Twenty-two (71%) reported that they did and nine (29%) reported that they did not.  
Seventeen (55%) respondents reported that automated patching and scanning was being 
performed, but collectively, they were compromised eight times.  One might question the 
length of time between detection and remediation of known vulnerabilities. A closer look 
at the responses regarding automated scanning and automated patching revealed that the 
average length of time between scans is 5.3 months.  Three (37.5%) of those 
organizations scan and patch every 1-3 months,  2 (25%) others scan every 4 -6 months, 
and 3 (37.5%) others scan every 10-12 months.   Of those eight compromises, one (13%) 
was serious, and 3 (37.5%) were reported to be lacking the appropriate patch.  
Furthermore, 6 (75%) of those compromises originated from email and 2 (25%) were 
compromised via the Web. Another discovery was that the other 14 respondents that did 
not perform both automatic scanning and patching were collectively compromised seven 
times.  The responses for both Questions 10 and 11 revealed that 50 percent of those 
commands not performing automated scanning and patching on a continual basis 
maintain 50 percent of the systems compromised over the past 12 months.  The review of 
Questions 12 and 13, regarding manual scanning and patching, revealed that of the 16 
(52%) commands that utilize manual methods, collectively they contributed to 
approximately 44% of the past year’s compromised systems, as seven (44%) of the 16 
sites experienced a compromise.  Interestingly, six of those compromises stemmed from 
email and one was due to an outdated anti-virus signature.  The 15 (48%) respondents 
that do not utilize manual scan patching methods collectively contributed to eight systems 
compromises, which is approximately 53% of the total.  Questions 10 through 13, which 
cover both automated and manual scanning and patching practices revealed that 11 (35%) 
of all survey respondents were utilizing both methods and 20 (65%) were not.  The 
average time between scans for those that were utilizing both methods was 5.2 months.  
Of the 11 (35%) that were performing both, 5 (45%) had been compromised.  As one 
may easily recognize, automation does not provide a significant advantage over manual 
methods if the tools are not being employed on a monthly basis as required by the 
Military Health Systems (MHS) Information Assurance Policy.  This survey should 
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highlight the speed in which the new threats are approaching and that automation must be 





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CORRELATION OF RESULTS IN COMPARISON TO PREMISE 
The premise that 75 percent of Naval Medicine’s known information systems 
compromises were not protected by the available vulnerability patch(s) was not 
confirmed.  The findings and consolidated view of this study are depicted below in 
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Figure 9.   Regional Survey Response 
Survey respondents from 14 (45%) commands reported known systems 
compromises within the past year.  Seven (50%) of those respondents reported that the 
available vulnerability patches had not been applied.  In essence, 50 percent of the known 
attacks were due to the tardiness in application of the appropriate protection.  It bears 
repeating that the average length of time between automated vulnerability scans 
combined with automated patching is 5.3 months.  If this average detection and response 
time is not corrected, the next 12 months may show a marked increase in system 
compromises. 
B. THESIS QUESTIONS REVIEW 
1. Are existing Naval Medicine Information Assurance policies in alignment 
with current Navy policy and federal government requirements?  The existing policies 
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are all vague and general with regard to vulnerability assessments and patching 
requirements.  MHS has the most up-to-date information, but the requirements within that 
document still fall short of best-business practices.  Nearly every published document 
pertaining to information assurance within the past year highlights the current threats, 
reports that the patch management industry is a spiraling market, and that near real time 
scanning and patching are the only real options left to safeguard connected information 
assets.  
2. Would the implementation of automated vulnerability scanning and 
patching technology benefit Naval Medicine?  As previously mentioned in Question 1, 
automated scanning and patching solutions as close to real time as possible are the most 
effective means to securing information assets to protect them form the current threat 
environment.  The continued occasional use will not provide the true ROI associated with 
more aggressive automated vulnerability assessment practices. 
3. Would automated vulnerability scanning and patching be a cost-effective 
means to address the current information assurance threats?  Gartner group estimates 
that a 1000 unit server farm costs $300,000 per year to perform patch management tasks.  
The same server population would cost $50,000 to implement an automated solution.  
Since this researcher does not have access to the actual number of systems within Naval 
Medicine, the following subjective estimate is submitted.   
BUMED estimates personnel strength to be approximately 60,000.  If only 25 
percent of those personnel utilized information systems to perform their tasks, that would 
mean that Naval Medicine maintains about 15,000 systems.  The sample population for 
this IA survey reports that the aggregate of respondents currently have 27 dedicated 
personnel to perform patch management within their organization.  The sample size only 
represented approximately 61 percent of the CIOs in Naval Medicine.  If all had 
responded, the results may have approached a total of approximately 50 personnel that 
performed patch management as their primary duty.   If each of them maintains a salary 
of $40,000 per year, Naval Medicine spends approximately $2M per year in maintenance 
costs to protect their information assets, while 50 percent of manually scanned and 
patched systems are compromised within a one-year time frame.  If these figures are 
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somewhat close to the truth, a commercial vendor's automated scanning and patching 
solution would cost approximately $750,000 per year.   
In addition, one must consider that the conservative approach of 31 known 
reported system compromises as reported by the survey respondents occurred within the 
past year.  It is unknown which systems were compromised, but if personal privacy data 
was compromised on any of them, the fiscal penalties from the HIPAA violations alone 
could easily go beyond $750K.   
Outside of the HIPAA requirements, the reported costs to rebuild compromised 
systems takes approximately 2-4 hours depending on the operating system and data files 
required.  Currently 17 of the respondents report that they spend 10 + hours per system 
per month to keep each system patched and configured to meet the current information 
assurance threats.  Considering that a system administrator’s salary is approximately 
$40,000 per year, each month’s maintenance per system is approximately $3,300 dollars.  
If that figure is divided in half, the cost remains approximately $1,500 per month per 
system for the required maintenance.  If the vendor solution is $50 per year per system, 
recurring maintenance fees based on $1,500 per month cost approximately $18,000 per 
year.  That fee of $18,000 divided by $50.00 represents a 180 percent savings in 
maintenance costs if only half of the administrators were utilized.  This automation would 
not replace the administrative staff, but it would free up their valuable time to work on 
other significant maintenance issues.  The automated technology is well worth what it 
provides, but Naval Medicine personnel may not have the funding to invest in these 
technologies right away; however, options for automated solutions are free of charge 
from DISA and the Department of Homeland Security.  “An effective vulnerability-
assessment/patch management effort will reduce operational risks for everyone” (Shipley, 
2003). 
4. Would a consolidated and centrally managed vulnerability database 
increase the current security posture?   
Centrally managed vulnerability databases are already maintained by federally 
funded organizations such as NIST.  In the case of a centrally managed database that 
maintains tested patches, it may be helpful to have a secure source to pull from, but many 
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are opting out of patch testing as they would rather take one of their own systems offline 
as opposed to having their entire network, in many cases, exposed to the malware 
practitioners and hackers looking for free spam relays (Roberts, 2003). 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASING NAVAL MEDICINE 
INFOSEC POSTURE 
The IA survey revealed that approximately 42% of the respondents are not 
utilizing automated vulnerability assessment tools.  This translates to increased risk, 
increased costs and a lower confidence level for those personnel charged with the 
responsibility of safeguarding the organizations information assets.  Automation has 
faced much criticism in the past, as has any new technology.  According to the IA survey, 
45% of the respondents have concerns regarding reliability and another 32% are 
concerned about the effectiveness of automated assessment and patching solutions.  This 
researcher submits that nothing will ever be bulletproof, but proactively utilizing the best 
tools available to offset the threat will always remain the best defense (Shipley, January 
2003).   
The perceived benefit derived from the utilization of automated vulnerability 
assessment solutions can only promote a healthier and more secure networking 
environment for Naval Medicine professionals, while significantly decreasing the overall 
risk (Shipley, January 2003).  The continued increases of malware distribution, in 
conjunction with the increased reliance on networked information systems, create an 
overwhelming need to maintain confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information 
assets. The personnel hours required in typical monthly maintenance procedures alone 
will produce an immediate return on investment if funding is unavailable for an 
enterprise-wide solution (Schroder, 2003).  If funding is not available, an immediate 
effort should be made by those commands not using automated solutions to obtain the 
free GOTS vulnerability scanning solution from DISA.  
Security experts around the globe concur that today’s networked environment is 
more dangerous than it has ever been and those that do not utilize automated solutions in 
conjunction with layered defenses are at a much greater risk than those that are taking 
more proactive and aggressive approaches to securing their information assets.  
63 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A comparison of blocked attacks per organization in comparison to vulnerability 
scanning and mitigation practices may yield even more evidence regarding the 
probability of enhanced security based on speed in detection and mitigation of risk.  It 
would also be interesting to know how many compromises have been avoided within 
Naval Medicine due to the use of automated or manual vulnerability assessment methods 
and which tools were considered the best across the boards (i.e., ease of use, licensing 
expenses, etc.).  In addition, a comparison of formal policies and practices among those 
commands and regions may also provide for interesting research.  If BUMED began 
keeping track of compromises, over time, deviations in command practices and policy 
adherence may become more evident.  This survey only asked for the past 12 months of 
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APPENDIX C.  ENTIRE POPULATION – RAW DATA SURVEY 
RESPONSE SPREADSHEET 
No < 200 OUTCONUS 8+ CIO 
Planned < 200 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
No > 1000 INCONUS 4-5 CIO 
No 201 - 1000 INCONUS 6-7 CIO 
Planned 201 - 1000 OUTCONUS 8+ CIO 
No 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
No > 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Planned > 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Planned > 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Planned 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Yes 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ ISSM 
No 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Don't Know < 200 INCONUS 4-5 CIO 
No 201 - 1000 OUTCONUS 4-5 CIO 
Don't Know 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Yes 201 - 1000 INCONUS 2-3 CIO 
Planned 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Yes < 200 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Yes 201 - 1000 OUTCONUS 8+ CIO 
No < 200 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
No 201 - 1000 INCONUS 2-3 CIO 
Don't Know 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ ISSM 
Don't Know < 200 OUTCONUS 4-5 CIO 
No < 200 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Yes 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Planned 201 - 1000 INCONUS 6-7 CIO 
Planned < 200 INCONUS 8+ ISSM 
Planned 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
Yes < 200 INCONUS 2-3 CIO 
No 201 - 1000 INCONUS 8+ CIO 
No < 200 INCONUS 8+ Other 
Are all of your organization's 
applications certified and 
accredited under a full 
Authority to Operate (ATO)? 
How many personnel are 
employed within your 
organization? 
Where is your 
geographic location?
How many years of IT 
experience do you 
have?
What is your job 
title?
5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 
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Planned Planned Planned Planned 
Yes Planned Planned Planned 
No Yes No No 
No No No Yes 
Yes Planned No No 
No No No No 
No No Planned No 
No Yes Planned Planned 
Yes No Planned Planned 
Yes Yes Planned Planned 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No No No No 
Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know 
No Yes No No 
No Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know 
No No Planned Yes 
Yes Planned Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Planned Yes Yes 
Planned Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No No No 
Yes Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know 
No Yes Don't Know No 
Yes Yes No No 
No No Yes Yes 
Yes Planned Planned Yes 
Yes Yes Planned Planned 
No Planned Planned Planned 
Yes Planned Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No No No No 
Does your organization have a 
written patch management 
policy (e.g., patch prioritization 
based on risk or threat)? 
Does your organization have a 
written vulnerability 
assessment policy (e.g., 
maximum amount of time 
between assessments)? 
Is your organization's network 
certified and accredited under 
a full Authority to Operate 
(ATO)? 
Are all of your organization's 
servers certified and 
accredited under a full 
Authority to Operate (ATO)? 
9. 8. 7. 6. 
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No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No Planned No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
No No No Yes No 
Planned Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No No Yes Yes 
No No No Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No Yes No 
No Yes Yes No No 
Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No No No Yes Yes 
No No No Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes No Yes 
Don't Know Yes Don't Know Yes Yes 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No No Yes No No 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes Yes Planned 
Don't Know Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes No No No 
Does your organization 
use stand-alone 
systems to test 
patches before 
applying them to 
affected systems?

















14. 13. 12. 11. 10. 
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1-4 1-4 0 1-4 
0 0 0 0 
1-4 0 0 1-4 
1-4 0 0 1-4 
0 0 0 
1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 
0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5-9 0 0 5-9 
0 
1-4 0 0 1-4 
1-4 0 1-4 1-4 
1-4 1-4 0 1-4 
0 
0 
1-4 1-4 1-4 5-9 
0 
1-4 0 0 1-4 
0 0 0 0 
0 
0 1-4 0 1-4 
1-4 0 0 0 
10 + 1-4 0 10 + 




0 1-4 1-4 1-4 
** If you select 0, skip to 
question 21.
** If you select 0, skip to 
question 23.
How many known system 
compromises (e.g., 
unauthorized system 
events or data theft) 
were from e-mail 
delivered malware (e.g., 
worms, viruses, Trojans, 
etc.) in the past year?
How many of the 
compromises may have 
been prevented if the 
available patches had 
been installed?
How many of those 
compromises were 
considered as serious 
(e.g., great effort to 
restore, many systems 
affected, or higher 
authority intervention)?
How many known system 
compromises (e.g., 
unauthorized system 
events or data theft) 
including e-mail and Web-
based deliveries of 
malware have occurred 
within your organization in 
the past year?
18. 17. 16. 15. 
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0 0 1-4 0 
1-4 0 
1-4 0 0 1-4 
1-4 1-4 0 0 
10 + 0 0 1-4 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1-4 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1-4 1-4 0 1-4 
1-4 0 1-4 0 
1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 
0 0 1-4 0 
1-4 0 0 0 
0 0 
1-4 0 0 0 
1-4 0 1-4 1-4 
1-4 0 0 0 
10 + 0 
What is the average number of 
hours spent per month 
to decontaminate or 
remediate EACH system 
compromise within your 
organization?
How many known system 
compromises (e.g., 
unauthorized system 
events or data theft) 
were from Web-based 
malware (e.g., worms, 
viruses, Trojans, etc.) in 
the past year? 
How many of the e-mail 
delivered compromises 
may have been 
prevented if anti-virus 
signatures had been up 
to date?
How many of the e-mail 
delivered compromises 
were considered as 
serious (e.g., great effort 
to restore, many systems 
affected, or higher 
authority intervention)?
22. 21. 20. 19. 
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10-12 + 0 1-4 10 + 
1-3 1 1-4 10 + 
4-6 2 1-4 10 + 
4-6 1 1-4 10 + 
10-12 + 0 1-4 1-4 
10-12 + 0 1-4 10 + 
4-6 3+ 1-4 10 + 
1-3 3+ 5-9 10 + 
7-9 1 1-4 1-4 
1-3 1 1-4 1-4 
1-3 3+ 5-9 10 + 
10-12 + 0 1-4 0 
1-3 0 0 1-4 
1-3 1 1-4 10 + 
10-12 + 1 1-4 1-4 
10-12 + 0 0 10 + 
1-3 0 1-4 1-4 
4-6 2 1-4 1-4 
7-9 1 1-4 10 + 
10-12 + 0 1-4 10 + 
1-3 1 1-4 10 + 
1-3 1 1-4 1-4 
10-12 + 1 1-4 10 + 
10-12 + 0 1-4 0 
1-3 1 1-4 1-4 
1-3 1 1-4 10 + 
1-3 1 1-4 10 + 
10-12 + 1 1-4 10 + 
1-3 1 1-4 1-4 
1-3 0 1-4 10 + 
10-12 + 0 1-4 1-4 
How many months pass 
between each systems 
vulnerability/penetration 
test?
How many system 
administrators does your 
organization employ to 
perform patch 
management/system 
configuration tasks on 
your network as their 
primary duty?
How many system 
administrators does your 
organization employ to 
perform patch 
management/system 
configuration tasks that 
are incorporated with 
their other 
responsibilities?
What is the average number of 
hours spent per month 
to keep EACH system 
patched and configured 
to meet new security 
threats?
26. 25. 24. 23. 
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Tools Reliability Yes 0-50 
Tools Compatibility No 0-50 
Tools Other No 101-150 
Tools Reliability Yes 0-50 
Tools Effectiveness Yes 0-50 
Training Reliability No 0-50 
Funding Effectiveness No 0-50 
Funding Reliability No 101-150 
Tools Effectiveness Yes 51-100 
Funding Reliability Yes 0-50 
Training Effectiveness Yes 101-150 
Tools Effectiveness No 0-50 
Training Other Don't Know 0-50 
Tools Reliability Yes 0-50 
Training Effectiveness Yes 0-50 
Funding Reliability No 0-50 
Funding Compatibility Yes 0-50 
Tools Effectiveness Yes 0-50 
Tools Reliability No 0-50 
Training Effectiveness No 0-50 
Funding Reliability No 51-100 
Training Effectiveness Yes 0-50 
Services Effectiveness No 0-50 
Funding Other Yes 0-50 
Training Reliability Yes 0-50 
Funding Reliability Yes 0-50 
Training Reliability Yes 0-50 
Funding Reliability No 0-50 
Funding Compatibility No 0-50 
Tools Reliability No 0-50 
Funding Other No 0-50 
What type of assistance from 
the DoD would most 
greatly assist you in your 
IA efforts?
What is your greatest concern 
with using automated 
vulnerability/patch 
management tools?
Do you believe you have 
sufficient resources to 
keep each system 
patched and configured 
to meet new security 
threats? 
Approximately how many 
servers reside on your 
network?












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX D.  ENTIRE POPULATION – END ANCHORED DATA 
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Q # 5 Q # 6 Q # 7  
Mean 2.37931 Mean 2.066667 Mean 2.333333
Standard Error 0.181766 Standard Error 0.185282 Standard Error 0.187747
Median 2 Median 2 Median 2
Mode 2 Mode 1 Mode 3
Standard Deviat 0.97884 Standard Deviat 1.014833 Standard Deviat 1.028334
Sample Varianc 0.958128 Sample Varianc 1.029885 Sample Varianc 1.057471
Kurtosis -0.8984 Kurtosis -0.87913 Kurtosis -1.12871
Skewness 0.118182 Skewness 0.49552 Skewness 0.075501
Range 3 Range 3 Range 3
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 4 Maximum 4 Maximum 4
Sum 69 Sum 62 Sum 70
Count 29 Count 30 Count 30
Confidence Lev 0.372331 Confidence Lev 0.378945 Confidence Lev 0.383987
Q # 8 Q # 9 Q # 10
Mean 2.333333 Mean 1.62069 Mean 1.5
Standard Error 0.187747 Standard Error 0.135132 Standard Error 0.133477
Median 2 Median 2 Median 1
Mode 3 Mode 1 Mode 1
Standard Deviat 1.028334 Standard Deviat 0.727706 Standard Deviat 0.731083
Sample Varianc 1.057471 Sample Varianc 0.529557 Sample Varianc 0.534483
Kurtosis -1.12871 Kurtosis 2.649576 Kurtosis 3.474654
Skewness 0.075501 Skewness 1.339382 Skewness 1.701912
Range 3 Range 3 Range 3
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 4 Maximum 4 Maximum 4
Sum 70 Sum 47 Sum 45
Count 30 Count 29 Count 30
Confidence Lev 0.383987 Confidence Lev 0.276805 Confidence Lev 0.272991
Q # 11 Q # 12 Q # 13
Mean 1.266667 Mean 1.5 Mean 1.366667
Standard Error 0.126249 Standard Error 0.149712 Standard Error 0.122083
Median 1 Median 1 Median 1
Mode 1 Mode 1 Mode 1
Standard Deviat 0.691492 Standard Deviat 0.820008 Standard Deviat 0.668675
Sample Varianc 0.478161 Sample Varianc 0.672414 Sample Varianc 0.447126
Kurtosis 8.877688 Kurtosis 4.156476 Kurtosis 7.219289
Skewness 2.942952 Skewness 2.010164 Skewness 2.37972
Range 3 Range 3 Range 3
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 4 Maximum 4 Maximum 4
Sum 38 Sum 45 Sum 41
Count 30 Count 30 Count 30
Confidence Lev 0.258207 Confidence Lev 0.306196 Confidence Lev 0.249688
APPENDIX E.  ALL RESPONSE STATISTICS SPREADSHEET FOR 













Q # 14 Q # 15 Q # 16
Mean 1.966667 Mean 1.566667 Mean 1.142857
Standard Error 0.155241 Standard Error 0.141286 Standard Error 0.078246
Median 2 Median 1 Median 1
Mode 2 Mode 1 Mode 1
Standard Deviat 0.850287 Standard Deviat 0.773854 Standard Deviat 0.358569
Sample Varianc 0.722989 Sample Varianc 0.598851 Sample Varianc 0.128571
Kurtosis 1.483672 Kurtosis 2.057227 Kurtosis 3.138402
Skewness 1.14776 Skewness 1.436444 Skewness 2.201737
Range 3 Range 3 Range 1
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 4 Maximum 4 Maximum 2
Sum 59 Sum 47 Sum 24
Count 30 Count 30 Count 21
Confidence Lev 0.317503 Confidence Lev 0.288962 Confidence Lev 0.163218
Q # 17 Q # 18 Q # 19
Mean 1.285714 Mean 1.75 Mean 1.294118
Standard Error 0.101015 Standard Error 0.175844 Standard Error 0.113911
Median 1 Median 2 Median 1
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 1
Standard Deviat 0.46291 Standard Deviat 0.786398 Standard Deviat 0.469668
Sample Varianc 0.214286 Sample Varianc 0.618421 Sample Varianc 0.220588
Kurtosis -1.06433 Kurtosis 2.248449 Kurtosis -1.16571
Skewness 1.023275 Skewness 1.21751 Skewness 0.993609
Range 1 Range 3 Range 1
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 2 Maximum 4 Maximum 2
Sum 27 Sum 35 Sum 22
Count 21 Count 20 Count 17
Confidence Lev 0.210714 Confidence Lev 0.368045 Confidence Lev 0.241481
Q # 20 Q # 21 Q # 22
Mean 1.294118 Mean 1.15 Mean 1.7
Standard Error 0.113911 Standard Error 0.081918 Standard Error 0.163836
Median 1 Median 1 Median 2
Mode 1 Mode 1 Mode 2
Standard Deviat 0.469668 Standard Deviat 0.366348 Standard Deviat 0.732695
Sample Varianc 0.220588 Sample Varianc 0.134211 Sample Varianc 0.536842
Kurtosis -1.16571 Kurtosis 2.775855 Kurtosis 3.979013
Skewness 0.993609 Skewness 2.12306 Skewness 1.445108
Range 1 Range 1 Range 3
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 2 Maximum 2 Maximum 4
Sum 22 Sum 23 Sum 34
Count 17 Count 20 Count 20
Confidence Lev 0.241481 Confidence Lev 0.171456 Confidence Lev 0.342912
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Q # 23 Q # 24 Q # 25
Mean 3.133333 Mean 2 Mean 1.933333
Standard Error 0.201907 Standard Error 0.067806 Standard Error 0.165629
Median 4 Median 2 Median 2
Mode 4 Mode 2 Mode 2
Standard Deviat 1.105888 Standard Deviat 0.371391 Standard Deviat 0.907187
Sample Varianc 1.222989 Sample Varianc 0.137931 Sample Varianc 0.822989
Kurtosis -1.40655 Kurtosis 5.581349 Kurtosis 0.727628
Skewness -0.60801 Skewness 0 Skewness 1.028411
Range 3 Range 2 Range 3
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 4 Maximum 3 Maximum 4
Sum 94 Sum 60 Sum 58
Count 30 Count 30 Count 30
Confidence Lev 0.412946 Confidence Lev 0.13868 Confidence Lev 0.338749
Q # 26 Q # 27 Q # 28
Mean 2.266667 Mean 1.266667 Mean 1.566667
Standard Error 0.248829 Standard Error 0.11679 Standard Error 0.123952
Median 2 Median 1 Median 1.5
Mode 1 Mode 1 Mode 1
Standard Deviat 1.362891 Standard Deviat 0.639684 Standard Deviat 0.678911
Sample Varianc 1.857471 Sample Varianc 0.409195 Sample Varianc 0.46092
Kurtosis -1.77704 Kurtosis 3.701688 Kurtosis 4.070435
Skewness 0.355192 Skewness 2.249556 Skewness 1.513353
Range 3 Range 2 Range 3
Minimum 1 Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 4 Maximum 3 Maximum 4
Sum 68 Sum 38 Sum 47
Count 30 Count 30 Count 30
Confidence Lev 0.508912 Confidence Lev 0.238862 Confidence Lev 0.25351
Q # 29 Q # 30
Mean 1.966667 Mean 2.166667
Standard Error 0.169403 Standard Error 0.159621
Median 2 Median 2
Mode 2 Mode 3
Standard Deviat 0.927857 Standard Deviat 0.874281
Sample Varianc 0.86092 Sample Varianc 0.764368
Kurtosis 0.293101 Kurtosis -1.05533
Skewness 0.901792 Skewness -0.01229
Range 3 Range 3
Minimum 1 Minimum 1
Maximum 4 Maximum 4
Sum 59 Sum 65
Count 30 Count 30
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APPENDIX F.  LESSONS LEARNED DURING RESEARCH 
Three humbling lessons were learned during the development and analysis of this 
research project.  The first was the incorrect assumption on my part that the survey participants 
would be more eager to participate since the research was targeted to justify additional resources 
to facilitate their shortages in information assurance tools, training, funding, etc.  The second was 
the assumption that MS Word could maintain very large files.  Lastly, the belief that the electric 
company would have an uninterrupted power supply during data compilation was an inaccurate 
assumption. 
Surveys in general are not something that people do to pass the time of day.  I found 
myself doing quite a large number of follow up call and emails to encourage participation to an 
acceptable survey sample size.  Since the database was anonymously populated, each solicited 
participant had to be contacted since there was no way to determine who had submitted a survey 
response.  Anyone attempting to call around the globe should seriously consider purchasing 
prepaid phone cards or invest in a broadband phone to offset phone usage fees.  
Always ensure you know the processing limitation of your software applications.  Some 
applications are not forgiving of those that have not determined this in advance.  If you intend to 
utilize the NPS thesis template, know that graphics and multiple pages of text add to the total file 
size rather quickly.  Documents drafted in MS Word 2002 and MS Word XP docs can be created 
successfully up to 17 MB in file size. However, minor problems begin at around 13 MB if you 
start moving anchors, copying & pasting, TOC, indexing, etc. This issue can induce much 
aggravation and it is much more convenient to configure the maximum file size on Word 
documents to 12 MB. 
100 
When compiling large amounts of information, be sure that your computer automatically 
saves your information at a minimum of every five minutes.  Power outages can occur in Marina,  
California on sunny days in the same way they occur during severe thunder storm days in the 
Midwest.  Interruptions in electrical power can promote unnecessary increases in the blood 
pressure and heart rate when your document has not been saved recently…regardless of 
operating system.   
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